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ABSTRACT 
The strategy a campus police leader and university administration adopt in a 
post-9/11 world must consider the context of campus attacks and foiled plots over the 
past 12 years: the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, the 2014 University of California Santa 
Barbara attack killing six, and, tangentially, the 2015 arrest by Boston Police of a Boston 
Police captain’s son for plotting an Islamic State-inspired attack against a college 
campus. The nexus among the three attacks is that the campus and campus community 
were the direct targets of the attacks. Whether it be the threat of an individual’s 
radicalization or an untreated mental illness, American college campuses are today and 
shall foreseeably remain locations challenged by the potential for violence. This issue can 
be examined internally through threat assessment teams or campus partnerships with key 
stakeholders and externally through community policing partnerships, training, and 
networking. Given the increasing complexity and diverse social fabric of colleges and 
universities, campus police leaders must understand and prepare for a wide range of 
threats in a post-9/11 and politically polarized era.
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Given the increasing complexity and diverse social fabric of colleges and 
universities, campus police leaders must understand and prepare for a wide range of threats 
in a post-9/11 and politically polarized era. Of the many complexities facing campus police 
leaders, determining how best to apply successful policing strategies in the campus setting 
while being mindful of the current threats to homeland security is particularly vexing. 
Much like their municipal counterparts, campus safety officials must be constantly aware 
of and review potential threats to their campus communities. They must also continually 
expand their knowledge of the types of threats that may occur as well as proactively 
identify risk and effectively address threats.  
Following the Boston Marathon attack in 2013, I, along with a number of senior 
leaders in campus policing, questioned how many other would-be attackers like Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev—a student at UMass Dartmouth—are enrolled at our institutions of higher 
learning and living in campus housing. The complexity of managing risk in a campus 
environment requires that campus leaders and their administrators have a reasonable 
understanding of the current threat environment, assess inherent risk, and appraise campus 
readiness. Understanding the lessons of this counterfactual analysis (CFA) requires careful 
analysis and discussion on the uniqueness of campus policing and the campus environment, 
and how best to apply successful policing strategies in the campus setting, while being 
mindful of the current threats to homeland security. Campus police leaders are expected to 
be knowledgeable, skillful, and committed to their own campuses, in addition to being an 
institutional resource for collaboration with local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies. This CFA is intended to identify key strategies and practices that will illuminate 
the benefits of assigning a campus police task force officer (TFO) to the Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTF) versus the cost of not doing so in this current threat environment. 
Several campus incidents highlighted the new challenges that call for campus safety 
leaders to be involved in threat assessment and counterterrorism strategies. Although the 
Boston Marathon bombing did not occur on a college campus, there was a strong nexus to 
local colleges and universities. This CFA identified chokepoints in the timeline of the 
xiv 
Boston Marathon bombing wherein campus police involvement may have impacted the 
outcome. The purpose of the CFA is not to second-guess the FBI, police officials at UMass 
Dartmouth, MIT, Boston police, or any college or university administrators affected 
directly or indirectly by the Boston Marathon bombing. Rather, the CFA juxtaposes several 
key behaviors and actions of the two perpetrators prior to, during, and after the attack 
against the uniqueness of FBI JTTFs and their practices, campus populations, and campus 
public safety practices. The analysis of the CFA enabled this writer explore and identify 
unrecognized opportunities to intervene.  
This CFA built upon community policing practices on college campuses and how 
these practices can take on many forms, similar to how community policing is applied by 
municipal police in an urban community versus a suburban community. Whether the 
campus is suburban or urban or at a private or state university, the principles of community 
policing are relevant and should form the framework of the department’s community 
policing strategy. A campus community policing strategy must consider (1) community 
engagement and partnerships, (2) problem solving and prevention; (3) organizational 
development and change; and (4) analysis, measurement, and evaluation, which are 
essential for understanding and improving performance outcomes. This CFA postulates 
that a robust community policing on strategy on campuses enables campus police leaders 
to address campus policing challenges and to recognize the nexus between threats to the 
homeland and to college campuses.  
The Clery Act has provided a national framework for disclosing campus crime 
statistics and information about safety policies and programs. The CFA examines the Clery 
Act against the inherent openness and accessibility of college campuses, which make them 
uniquely vulnerable to targeted violence and terrorist plots. This CFA details the strategies 
campus police can use to maintain a safe campus and how campus safety leaders can 
engage in and benefit from the broader homeland security efforts. Several campus incidents 
highlighted the new challenges that call for campus safety leaders to be involved in threat 
assessment and counterterrorism strategies. For example, the massacre at Virginia Tech in 
2006 made violent crime and threat assessment at institutions of higher education a key 
focus, as is chronicled in a 2010 report coauthored by members of the U.S. Secret Service, 
xv 
the U.S. Department of Education, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.1 One decade 
later, in 2016, a new challenge emerged when 13 people were injured after an Ohio State 
student from Somalia drove his car into a crowd of people on campus and then pursued the 
onlookers with a butcher knife before being shot and killed by an Ohio State University 
police officer. The FBI found that the attacker, Abdul Razak Ali Artan, had not been the 
subject of any investigations before the attack and that he acted alone without any direction 
from a terrorist organization, but it concluded that “he was influenced by the Islamic 
State.”2 In August 2017, armed white nationalists marched through the campus of the 
University of Virginia with tiki torches chanting “White lives matter” and “Jews will not 
replace us,” signaling yet another complex threat dynamic campus police must consider.3 
Mass shootings, terrorism, and violence and intimidation by domestic violent extremists 




                                                 
1 Diana A. Drysdale, William Modzeleski, and Andre B. Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence 
Affecting Institutions of Higher Education (Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, 2010). 
2 Kevin Stankiewicz, “FBI: Ohio State attacker not directed by terrorist organization,” The Lantern, 
November 28, 2017, https://www.thelantern.com/2017/11/fbi-ohio-state-attacker-not-directed-by-terrorist-
organization/. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The strategy a campus police leader and university administration adopts in a post–
9/11 world must take into consideration the context of campus attacks and foiled plots over 
the past 12 years. These offenses and the men responsible include the 2007 Virginia Tech 
massacre (committed by Seung-Hui Cho), the 2014 University of California, Santa 
Barbara, attack killing six (committed by Elliot Rodger), and, tangentially, the 2015 arrest 
by Boston Police of a Boston Police captain’s son (Alexander Ciccolo) for plotting an 
Islamic State–inspired attack against a college campus.1  
The nexus among the three attacks is that the campus and campus community were 
the direct target of the attacks. Whether it be the threat of an individual’s radicalization or 
an untreated mental illness, American college campuses are today and shall foreseeably 
remain locations challenged by the potential for violence. This issue can be examined 
internally through threat assessment teams or campus partnerships with key stakeholders 
and externally through community policing partnerships, training, and networking.2 Given 
the increasing complexity and diverse social fabric of colleges and universities, campus 
police leaders must understand and prepare for a wide range of threats in a post–9/11 and 
politically polarized era.  
Of the many complexities facing campus police leaders, determining how best to 
apply successful policing strategies in the campus setting while being mindful of the 
current threats to homeland security is particularly vexing. Much like their municipal 
counterparts, campus safety officials must be constantly aware of and review potential 
                                                 
1 “Killer’s Manifesto: ‘You Forced Me Into a Corner’: Massacre at Virginia Tech,” CNN, April 18, 
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/04/18/vtech.shooting/index.html?eref=onion; Alyssa Rosenberg, 
“Elliot Rodger’s UCSB Massacre, Sexual Assaults and Campus Speech Codes,” Washington Post, May 27, 
2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2014/05/27/elliot-rodgers-ucsb-massacre-sexual-
assaults-and-campus-speech-codes/?utm_term=.1b45912e224b; Devlin Barrett, “Boston Police Captain’s 
Son Arrested in ISIS-Inspired Plot,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
boston-police-captains-son-arrested-in-isis-inspired-plot-1436816697. 
2 “Threat Assessment and Management: Working with the Community to Prevent Violence,” Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, accessed September 21, 2016, 
http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu. 
2 
threats to their campus communities. They must also continually expand their knowledge 
of the types of threats that may occur as well as proactively identify risk and effectively 
address threats. This expansion of knowledge includes learning about and engaging in new 
and emerging tools, including campus threat assessments and counterterrorism strategies.3  
Several campus incidents highlighted the new challenges that call for campus safety 
leaders to be involved in threat assessment and counterterrorism strategies. For example, 
the massacre at Virginia Tech in 2007 made violent crime and threat assessment at 
institutions of higher education a key focus, as is chronicled in a 2010 report coauthored 
by members of the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Department of Education, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).4 One decade later, in 2016, a new challenge emerged when 
13 people were injured after an Ohio State student from Somalia drove his car into a crowd 
of people on campus and then pursued the onlookers with a butcher knife before being shot 
and killed by an Ohio State University police officer. The FBI found that the attacker, 
Abdul Razak Ali Artan, had not been the subject of any investigations prior to the attack. 
Furthermore, while the FBI’s review demonstrated that Artan had acted independently and 
not specifically under the purview of a terrorist organization, they believe that “he was 
influenced by the Islamic State.”5 In August 2017, armed white nationalists marched 
through the campus of the University of Virginia with tiki torches chanting “White lives 
matter” and “Jews will not replace us,” signaling yet another complex threat dynamic 
campus police must consider.6 Mass shootings, terrorism, and violence and intimidation 
by domestic violent extremists have expanded the range and complexity of threats facing 
college campuses.  
                                                 
3 Diana A. Drysdale, William Modzeleski, and Andre B. Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence 
Affecting Institutions of Higher Education (Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, 2010).  
4 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons. 
5 Kevin Stankiewicz, “FBI: Ohio State Attacker Not Directed by Terrorist Organization,” The Lantern, 
November 28, 2017, https://www.thelantern.com/2017/11/fbi-ohio-state-attacker-not-directed-by-terrorist-
organization/. 




Campus police leaders may become engaged in the analysis of campus threats 
through the assignment of officers to FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). (JTTFs 
represent a collaborative effort to prevent and respond to the threat of terrorism and work 
under the jurisdiction of the FBI.) Still, it seems that often neither campus police leaders 
nor administrators fully realize the value and importance of including campus police 
representatives on JTTFs. This oversight makes for a significant security gap that could, 
for example, be exploited by nontraditional collectors of intelligence (researchers and 
faculty members) working on behalf of the People’s Republic of China involved in 
collaborative research on a college campus. Or, as in the Boston Marathon bombing case, 
a student enrolled at a college or university could contrive and execute an attack while 
residing under the protection of the campus police.  
All four people arrested and convicted in the Boston Marathon bombing or for 
impeding the investigation were UMass Dartmouth students: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and three 
of his friends, who lied to the FBI and/or removed evidence from Tsarnaev’s dorm room 
after learning of his involvement in the Marathon bombing. Two of the three fatalities of 
the attack had a direct connection with a college in Boston. One of the three killed by the 
blast at the finish line was a Chinese national student attending Boston University (BU). 
Officer Sean Collier, who was murdered by the Tsarnaev brothers three days after the 
bombing, worked for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) police department. 
There were no campus police officers assigned to the FBI JTTF in the months and years 
leading up to the bombing. The Boston Marathon bombing offers a window into campus 
populations, jurisdictions, public safety capabilities, and public safety personnel.  
My familiarity with the JTTF began following 9/11. The Yale police was one of 
the first campus police departments to assign an officer to the JTTF.7 A detective was 
assigned full time from 2001 to 2007. Campus administrators did not question the efficacy 
of the assignment. By contrast, university administrators recognized an imperative need 
for increased unity of effort and collaboration across traditional boundaries. The Campus 
                                                 
7 Alexandra Adler, “Yale Cop Reports to FBI.” Yale Daily News, September 9, 2005, 
http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2005/09/09/yale-cop-reports-to-fbi/.  
4 
Liaison Program and National Security Higher Education Advisory Board were not yet 
created, so there were few options for the chief and university administrators to consider. 
The university itself fully supported Yale police involvement in the JTTF despite concern 
among some students and faculty about the perceived lack of respect for civil liberties.8  
Fifteen years later, in 2016, I contemplated the reassignment of a Yale police officer 
to the JTTF following a series of threats to some notable faculty whose international 
profile, work, and public comments came to the attention of some of America’s sworn 
enemies. One notable threat involved Professor Robert Schiller, a prominent Yale 
economist and Nobel Prize winner. An article appeared in the September 2015 edition of 
Inspire magazine, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s English language magazine, calling 
for the killing of famous American economists as a way to cripple the Western economy.9 
My concern was for the safety of this faculty member and the campus community as a 
whole. In developing a business case for the reassignment of a Yale police officer to the 
JTTF, I had to consider the efficacy of the assignment and the relative benefit to the 
institution versus the cost of not doing so. At the time, no playbook existed that I could 
refer to in seeking my institutions approval for the assignment. The complexity of 
managing risk in a campus environment requires that campus leaders and their 
administrators have a reasonable understanding of the current threat environment, assess 
inherent risk, and appraise campus readiness. A feasible solution was the reassignment of 
a Yale police officer to the New Haven FBI JTTF. The assignment enabled the officer to 
forge strategic partnerships among other federal agencies, senior members of the campus 
research community, state religious leaders, and the FBI. Such alliances offer tools and 
campaigns that can complement a comprehensive campus safety strategy while delivering 
proactive measures for identifying and addressing potential situations. 
More than 18 years after 9/11, campus police chiefs and administrators are still 
unsure about the role campus police officers can play on a JTTF. This thesis uses CFA to 
examine how campus police participation in the FBI JTTF could have helped the FBI 
                                                 
8 Adler. 
9 “Assassinations: Field Tactics,” Inspire, 14, no. 1436 (Summer 2015): 43. See Appendix B. 
5 
intercede sooner and prevent some or all the events surrounding the attacks studied in this 
research. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What does a CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing reveal about the potential value 
of campus police inclusion in FBI JTTFs? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The practice of campus policing has existed for more than 100 years. However, the 
events of 9/11 have had far-reaching safety and security implications on federal, state, and 
local levels as well as in the college environment with respect to terrorist threats and 
activity. This has been more recently highlighted through the Boston Marathon bombing 
and the Charlottesville incidents as well as on the campuses of the University of California, 
Berkeley, and St. Catherine University in St. Paul. Situations such as these have created an 
imperative for campus police and all stakeholders in the war on terrorism to ensure a more 
cohesive approach to connecting the dots—from identifying actionable threats and 
intelligence to formulating appropriate strategies to better create an aligned and proactive 
response—including forming partnerships such as JTTFs.  
Numerous arguments and recommendations for collaboration across the spectrum 
of the homeland security enterprise (HSE) appear in government-sponsored reports and 
studies, such as the 2005 “National Summit on Campus Public Safety.”10 Specifically, one 
of the recommendations stated, “Campus police and security operations should be a viable 
part of the nation’s intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and application processes and 
should be incorporated into all regional and national efforts to improve the intelligence 
network.”11  
                                                 
10 Sheldon Greenberg, “National Summit on Campus Public Safety: Strategies for Colleges and 




According to a few sources, the FBI encourages campus police to be participants 
in JTTFs.12 In her 2011 article in Campus Safety magazine, Robin Hattersley-Gray 
supported the efforts of the FBI to collaborate with campus police and spoke to the broader 
efforts of the FBI in strengthening and supporting campuses through the Campus Liaison 
Initiative.13 In September 2019, FBI Special Agent and Adviser for Campus Public Safety 
Jeff Allison spoke to the members of the International Association of Campus Law 
Enforcement Administrators about the FBI’s efforts to partner with campus police.14  
Similarly, former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge offers his 
perspective on the role of universities in protecting the homeland in the National Summit 
report:  
Universities have truly helped America keep its republic—not just by 
imparting knowledge—but by fighting for the basic freedoms that have 
helped us perfect our democratic experiment, freedoms that simultaneously 
give hope to oppressed people everywhere. Our contemporary challenge is 
even broader. We must secure our free republic from those who seek to 
destroy it, who threaten not just our liberties, but also our lives. And 
universities can help.15 
Ridge stops short of providing specifics; however, it can be reasonably argued that his 
comments are meant to include the thought leadership, relevant resources, and innovation 
in universities. Thus, institutions of higher learning and the HSE must determine how the 
challenges Ridge describes can be effectively addressed.  
The university’s role in securing the homeland against potential destroyers, as 
Ridge prescribes, suggests campus police assist intelligence, identify hostile attackers, and 
actively monitor known threats. Such a role would be consistent with the basic tenet 
                                                 
12 Kevin Collier, “Inside the Controversial Government Centers Where the FBI Shares Intel with 
Police,” The Week, August 25, 2016, http://theweek.com/articles/643783/inside-controversial-government-
centers-where-fbi-shares-intel-police. 
13 Robin Hattersley-Gray, “FBI to Colleges: We Want to Work with You,” Campus Safety Magazine, 
February 22, 2011, http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/Fear-Not-the-FBI#. 
14 “Mission and History,” International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 
accessed September 16, 2019, https://www.iaclea.org/mission-and-history.  
15 Greenberg, “National Summit on Campus Public Safety.” 
7 
presented by the Brennan Center for Justice of “intelligence-led policing.”16 Its underlying 
principle is “to collect information about possible perpetrators and intervene before a crime 
is committed.”17 This approach is sound and can also be applied to an academic 
environment. Intelligence-led policing in the context of counterterrorism suggests that 
“analyzing even innocuous or disparate pieces of information can help ‘connect the dots’ 
and reveal potential terrorist plots.”18 Campus law enforcement can facilitate not only the 
reporting of these seemingly disparate “dots” but also their up-close and proactive 
observation and analysis. 
Yet, citing privacy grounds, other documents reveal a strong resistance to the 
incorporation of campus police with the FBI and JTTFs. Dating back more than a decade, 
some campus newspapers expressed concerns that campus police officers were working 
alongside the FBI, raising suspicions of anti-privacy (political surveillance) and a 
perceived infringement on the civil liberties of students and others.19 In 2005, Alexandra 
Adler of the Yale Daily News reported that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
“cited evidence on their website accusing the FBI of using the task forces to spy and 
interrogate both residents and college students in several states.”20 Justin Elliott in the 
Brown Herald reported similarly in 2008, emphasizing the concerns of the ACLU, writing 
that he “believes that cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement 
agencies—including campus police forces—are absolutely important, but that the task 
forces have raised serious concerns about civil liberties.”21 This reporting—spanning a 
                                                 
16 Michael Price, National Security and Local Police, (New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New 




19 “Study: Violations of Privacy Rights by Fusion Centers Are the Exception, Not the Rule,” IUPUI, 
July 19, 2016, http://news.iupui.edu/releases/2016/07/fusion-centers-privacy-concerns-carter.shtml. 
20 Adler, “Yale Cop Reports to FBI. 
21 Justin Elliott, “FBI Working with Campus Police Forces on Terrorism” The Brown Daily Herald, 
January 10, 2008, http://www.browndailyherald.com/2008/01/10/fbi-working-with-campus-police-forces-
on-terrorism/. 
8 
three-year period and less than a decade removed from the attacks on 9/11—illustrate a 
student perspective that rejects campus police involvement in JTTFs.  
Some scholars contend that the roles and missions of campus police have changed 
significantly. Michael Gould-Wartofsky described the shift in his 2012 article Homeland 
Security Goes to College: “Step by step, at school after school, the homeland security 
campus has executed a silent coup in the decade since September 11. The university, thus 
usurped, has increasingly become an instrument not of higher learning, but of intelligence 
gathering and paramilitary training.”22 Although Gould-Wartofsky’s tone is relatively 
disparaging here, he nevertheless highlights a major and undeniable paradigm shift in 
campus police expectations and not merely purpose. In my analysis, there is some 
substance to his points. While it is true that there has been an undeniable trend, it is not to 
the extent that Gould-Wartofsky described. Detailed agreements, including mutual aid 
agreements that describe the operational framework and collaborative working relationship 
between the departments, are often created between municipal police agencies and campus 
police.23 This is especially important due to the frequency of protests and student 
demonstrations on some campuses. The Police Executive Research Forum 2018 report The 
Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned, 
concluded that “mass demonstrations and other major events are too large and complex for 
a single agency to manage alone.”24  
In 1894, Yale University became the first private college to enter into an agreement 
with its host city (New Haven) to formally appoint two New Haven police officers as Yale 
                                                 
22 Michael Alexander Gould-Wartofsky, “Homeland Security Goes to College,” Mother Jones, March 
2012, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/homeland-security-college-campus-crackdown-
occupy?page=2. 
23 White House Task Force on Protecting Students, “Building Partnerships among Law Enforcement 
Agencies, Colleges and Universities: Developing a Memorandum of Understanding to Prevent and 
Respond Effectively to Sexual Assaults at Colleges and Universities,” January 2015, 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ovw/page/file/910376/download. 
24 “The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned,” Police 
Executive Research Forum, 2018, https://www.policeforum.org/assets/
PoliceResponseMassDemonstrations.pdf. 
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University police officers to patrol the campus.25 The two officers were hired following 
tense interactions between Yale students and the New Haven police following accusations 
that Yale Medical School students were removing bodies from a local cemetery and using 
them as cadavers.26 Although the two officers were appointed by the New Haven Board 
of Police Commissioners and approved by the president of Yale and the mayor of New 
Haven, there was no formal agreement as to the services provided by the city to the 
university in case of an emergency. The New Haven Police Department and Yale 
University’s Police Department did not formalize the operational framework and 
collaborative working relationship by the departments until nearly 100 years later, in 1992, 
with the creation of an official memorandum of understanding.27  
In 2007, Steven Healy, former president of the International Association of Campus 
Law Enforcement Administrators, testified before the United States Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. In his testimony, Healy stated, “College 
and university campuses are traditionally open and accessible environments that reflect our 
free and democratic society. We must balance the openness that is the hallmark of the 
American system of higher education with the need to protect students, faculty, staff, and 
visitors.”28 Those expectations are not unreasonable and are not analogous to efforts to 
militarize the police, as Gould-Wartofsky stated.29  
Historically, some colleges and universities have found themselves needing to 
address student protests or crime. Gary Margolis, Ph.D., argued in his dissertation 
                                                 
25 Keith Gehrand, “University Policing: Its Origins and Development,” Campus Law Enforcement 
Journal, 30(4), (2000), 1925; John J. Sloan, “The Modern Campus Police: An Analysis of Their Evolution, 
Structure and Function,” American Journal of Police, 11(2), (1992), 85–104. 
26 Gehrand; Sloan. 
27 “Memorandum of Understanding. New Haven Police Department–Yale Police Department” (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Police Department, September 29, 1992). See Appendix A for the full 
memorandum of understanding.  
28 Security on America’s College Campuses: Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, Senate, 110th Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 2007, 
http://www.margolishealy.com/files/resources/healy_testimony_for_congress.pdf. 
29 Gould-Wartofsky, “Homeland Security Goes to College,” 
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“Exploring Education and Leadership: A Police Chief’s Personal Journey of 
Convergence,” that “student unrest and crime on college campuses has been an issue 
reported as early as 1800 on such campuses as Miami University, Amherst, Brown, the 
University of South Carolina, Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Lafayette, Bowdoin, the City 
University of New York, Dickenson, and DePauw.”30 In 2007, James Christopher Wada 
argued in his doctoral dissertation “Betwixt and Between: The Perceived Legitimacy of 
Campus Police,” that “the formalization of campus police, at Yale, appears to be an 
exception rather than the rule in that time period,” referring to the late 1800s.31 It does not 
appear that the more expansive use of campus police occurred until the latter part of the 
1960s, resulting from campus protests and demonstrations that corresponded with the civil 
unrest that occurred in cities across the country during that period.32 In my analysis, 
formalizing campus police authority through the creation of memoranda of understanding 
between colleges and universities and municipal or state police creates an expectation that 
campus police protect the campus and provide professional services to students, faculty, 
staff, and visitors. Yale University’s agreement with New Haven to have their officers be 
appointed by the New Haven Board of Police Commissioners with the same authority as 
New Haven Police officers (municipal officers) is an example of a private university police 
department possessing the same police authority as the local police. The University of 
Texas police, a state university campus police department, was given police authority by 
the state following the killing of seventeen people and injury of thirty-five others during a 
shooting spree by Charles Whitman on August 1, 1966, at the University of Texas.33 At 
Yale and the University of Texas, a precipitating campus event led to a change in how the 
                                                 
30 Gary J. Margolis, “Exploring Education and Leadership: A Police Chief’s Personal Journey of 
Convergence,” PhD diss., University of Vermont, May 2001. 
31 David Nichols, “Campus Police: The New Professionals,” American School and University, 52 
(October 1979): 70–77.  
32 Eugene A. Paoline and John J. Sloan, “Variability in the Organizational Structure of Contemporary 
Campus Law Enforcement Agencies—A National-Level Analysis,” Policing: An International Journal of 
Police Strategies and Management, 26 (January 2003): 612–639. 
25 Wesley Forni and Star Gebser, “August 1, 1966,” Pennsylvania State Personal Web Server (blog), 
last modified December 6, 1996, www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/r/a/rae2/tower/august.html. 
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campus was policed. In my analysis, campus police acquiring municipal or state police 
authority, through memoranda of understanding, aligns with Steven Healy’s statement to 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in 2007—that the 
openness and accessibility of campuses reflective of our democratic society require campus 
police to protect students, faculty, staff, and visitors.34  
Just as Gould-Wartofsky argued that campus policing has begun to follow a 
paramilitary trend, the JTTFs to which campus police representatives could belong are not 
without their own problems. A 2012 research paper authored by Tung Yin advances the 
argument that JTTFs infringe on the civil liberties of Americans.35 Moreover, Yin’s 
research shows that the city of Portland, Oregon, is the only city that has ever withdrawn 
(removed from service) a local police officer for fear of rights infringement.36 Yin’s 
research summarizes the debate on “security versus liberty.”37 Further review of the 
concerns delineated in the Portland/JTTF case in Yin’s research is arguably analogous to 
the concerns raised by or to be expected by campus administrators wrestling with the idea 
of assigning a campus police officer to the JTTF. Portland, Oregon, is recognized for its 
liberal political views. According to Yin, “Portland’s decision to withdraw from, and then 
later to rejoin, the JTTF provides a good opportunity to analyze another instance of 
government decision makers’ attempt to determine the best balance point between national 
security and civil liberties.”38 Nonetheless, it is important to remember that there have 
                                                 
34 Security on America’s College Campuses: Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs. 
35 Tung Yin, “Joint Terrorism Task Forces as a Window into the Security vs. Civil Liberties Debate,” 
Florida Coastal Law Review, vol. 13 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046888. 
36 Brad Schmidt, “Joint Terrorism Task Force Debate Captures Portland’s Idiosyncratic Attitude,” The 
Oregonian, March 11, 2011, http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/03/
jttf_debate_captures_portlandshtml. 
37 Yin, “Joint Terrorism,” 105.  
38 Yin, 133.  
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been over 100 known terrorism plots since 9/11.39 With the ever-present threat of potential 
terrorist activity on university campuses, deeper partnerships must exist between campus 
police and local public safety agencies in determining the best balance point for campus 
police participation in JTTF.40 The literature is clear on the origins of campus policing, 
citing the first-ever American campus police department at Yale University in 1894 
through the 1960s, when campus police departments became the norm as a result of civil 
unrest and crime. One can even infer that the phenomenon of active shooter was started on 
a college campus with the Whitman shooting spree at the University of Texas, thus 
necessitating a deeper look into the authority need by campus police, as did the state of 
Texas following the shooting spree. In my analysis of the available literature, there is a gap 
as to the role of campus police in our nation’s counterterrorism efforts. This thesis is 
intended to provide clarity on what role campus police can play in supporting our nation’s 
counterterrorism efforts.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses a CFA to develop a conceivable alternative narrative to a terrorism 
event that occurred in a densely populated community known for its many colleges and 
universities: Boston, Massachusetts.41 The CFA utilizes the idiographic case-study 
approach, which “highlights points of indeterminacy at particular junctures” or what will 
be referred to as chokepoints before, during, and after the Boston Marathon bombing.42 
Specifically, the analysis explores what might have been different if UMass Dartmouth 
police and/or MIT police had officers assigned to the JTTF at key points leading up to, 
                                                 
39 David Inserra, “An Interactive Timeline of Islamist Terror Plots Since 9/11,” The Daily Signal, 
September 10, 2015, https://www.dailysignal.com/2015/09/10/a-timeline-of-73-islamist-terror-plots-since-
911/. 
40 Steven P. Bucci, James Jay Carafano, and Jessica Zuckerman, “60 Terrorist Plots since 9/11: 
Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism,” The Heritage Foundation. July 22, 2013, 
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/60-terrorist-plots-911-continued-lessons-domestic-
counterterrorism. 
41 Richard Ned Lebow, “Counterfactual Thought Experiments: A Necessary Teaching Tool,” History 
Teacher 40, no. 2 (2007), http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036985?origin=JSTOR-pdf, 154. 
42 Lebow.  
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during, and after the bombing. This event allows the FBI and campus police leaders alike 
to dig retrospectively into all of the missed opportunities to identify where a partnership 
among campus police leaders, the FBI, and the JTTF might have produced a different 
outcome. 
The antecedent or independent variable for this CFA is the assignment of an MIT 
or UMass Dartmouth police officer to the Boston FBI JTTF prior to the Boston Marathon 
bombing (the dependent variable). The more likely the antecedent (UMass Dartmouth and 
MIT have qualified sworn police officers), the more probable the conclusion (campus 
police are assigned to JTTFs in the Northeast and throughout the country). With the 
number of other things that would change because of the antecedent (participation by MIT 
or UMass Dartmouth Police could bring about changes in how information is shared—
before, during, and after an event), the easier it is to understand the antecedent (all of these 
are easily understood) and the better the counterfactual becomes. In this case, the 
antecedent is obvious, intuitive, highly probable, easily imagined, and uniquely suited to a 
CFA.  
To advance the understanding and effectiveness of campus police participation in 
JTTFs, I hypothesize that an assignment of a UMass Dartmouth police officer and/or MIT 
police officer to the JTTF before, during, or after the attack might have impacted the attack 
in four ways: (1) prevented the attack; (2) reduced the timeframe for capturing the suspects; 
(3) reduced casualties, namely the killing of officer Sean Collier; and (4) improved the 
chances of the older brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, being captured alive.  
D. THESIS ROADMAP  
In Chapter II, a comprehensive CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing is presented, 
including recommendations for campus police leaders and campus administrators. Chapter 
III discusses the nexus of counterterrorism. This chapter also present strategies for crime 
prevention and problem solving as well as methods of assessment. Chapter IV describes 
alliances and the relationships among the Department of Homeland Security, Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces, and other agencies in an effort to better identify and prevent 
campus threats.  
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II. THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS: 
BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING AND JTTFs 
This chapter applies a CFA to the Boston Marathon bombing that enables us to 
draw cause-and-effect conclusions in lieu of controlled experiments. This analysis only 
deals with chokepoints where there was a nexus to campus police involvement, not 
chokepoints of governmental intervention or lack thereof. While there were failures of the 
federal government, this CFA only examines those where campus police involvement may 
have impacted the outcome. The purpose of the CFA is not to second-guess the FBI, police 
officials at UMass Dartmouth, MIT, Boston police, or any college or university 
administrators affected directly or indirectly by the Boston Marathon bombing. Rather, the 
CFA in this chapter juxtaposes several key behaviors and actions of the two perpetrators 
prior to, during, and after the attack against the uniqueness of FBI JTTFs and their 
practices, campus populations, and campus public safety practices, in order to explore and 
identify unrecognized opportunities to intervene. Although the Boston Marathon bombing 
did not occur on a college campus, there was a strong nexus to local colleges and 
universities.  
The first step of the CFA is to examine the reasonableness of the scenario based on 
the conditions established in Chapter I. For example, both UMass Dartmouth and MIT 
police have fully trained and certified police officers, lending to the reasonableness of their 
potential participation in the JTTF. The second step is to analyze the scenario to determine 
how the participation of UMass Dartmouth and MIT police in Boston’s FBI JTTF might 
have affected law enforcement efforts leading up to the attack. The third step is to discern 
whether UMass Dartmouth and MIT police activity could have affected law enforcement’s 
response following the attack and during the ensuing five-day manhunt and investigation. 
Last, the chapter examines the scenario to determine likely complications with campus 
police participation.  
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A. THE TIMELINE  
1. 2009: Tamerlan Tsarnaev was interviewed for a feature photo essay titled 
“Will Box for Passport” in The Comment, a BU graduate student magazine. 
During the interview, in which he spoke about his amateur boxing career, 
he told the reporter, “I don’t have a single American friend, I don’t 
understand them,” referring to his frustration in assimilating to American 
life.43  
2. 2011: Tamerlan came to the attention of the Russian Federal Security 
Services, which contacted the FBI to report their suspicion that Tsarnaev 
was becoming radicalized and might return to Russia to join extremists 
there.44 The Boston JTTF “initiated an assessment to determine if Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev did indeed pose a terrorist threat” based on the Russian 
information.45 According to the House Homeland Security report, threat 
assessments are guided by “the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic 
FBI Operations.”46 The House report noted that an assessment is the least 
intrusive level of inquiry, smaller in scope compared to a preliminary 
investigation or full investigation.47 The Boston JTTF completed its 
assessment in June 2011, having found no link to terrorism.48 Nevertheless, 
a JTTF agent requested that Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s name be added to the 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System; this would ensure that an 
                                                 
43 Matilda Battersby, “‘I Don’t Have a Single American Friend’: Photo Essay Titled ‘Will Box for 
Passport’ Reveals Profile of Boston Bombing Suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev,” Independent, April 19, 2013, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/i-don-t-have-a-single-american-friend-photo-essay-
titled-will-box-for-passport-reveals-profile-of-8580575.html. 
44 “The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings, 
House Homeland Security Report, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security,” 
Federation of American Scientists, March 2014,11, https://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/boston.pdf. 
45 Federation of American Scientists, 11. 
46 Federation of American Scientists, 12. 
47 Federation of American Scientists, 13. 
48 Federation of American Scientists, 13. 
17 
electronic message would be sent to U.S. Customs officials whenever he 
left or reentered the United States. Also, in 2011, the Central Intelligence 
Agency requested that Tamerlan’s name be added to the National 
Counterterrorism Center’s watch list.49  
3. January 2012: Tamerlan Tsarnaev traveled to Dagestan, the war-torn, 
Northern Caucasus/Chechnya region in Russia, where he was believed to 
have joined Islamic Radicals, “the al-Qaeda affiliated Caucasus Emirate.”50 
He was neither stopped nor questioned on his departure from the United 
States or upon re-entry to the United States in July 2012.  
4. January 2013: three months before he and his brother detonated bombs at 
the Boston Marathon and months after Tamerlan Tsarnaev returned from 
Dagestan, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev learned his financial aid at UMass Dartmouth 
would be revoked due to poor grades. He appealed the decision to revoke 
his financial aid, claiming that “he lost too many loved relatives” in the 
Chechen Republic, where his family resided (Figure 1). In his appeal, 
Dzhokhar wrote that Russian soldiers “falsely accuse and abduct innocent 
men under false pretenses and terrorism accusations.”51 Such a statement 
may have been informed or influenced by his brother’s recent experiences 
while traveling in the region. In the same month Dzhokhar learned he was 
losing his financial aid, Tamerlan Tsarnaev attended prayer at the Islamic 
Society of Boston on the holiday celebrating the birthday of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. While there, he engaged in a shouting match with religious 
                                                 
49 Federation of American Scientists, 13. 
50 Colin P. Clarke, Jihadist Violence in the Caucasus: Russia Between Counterterrorism and 
Counterinsurgency, Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/
CT483/RAND_CT483.pdf 
51 DeLuca, “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Attributed His 1.094 GPA to Chechen-Russian Relations.” 
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leaders, alleging they were hypocrites for encouraging Muslims to observe 
American holidays.52 
 
Figure 1. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s academic progress appeal at UMass 
Dartmouth citing Chechen-Russian issues and his family’s situation for his 
academic problems53 
5. Pre-Marathon: Preparation for the Monday, April 15, 2013, Boston 
Marathon involved multiple local, state, and federal law enforcement and 
emergency management agencies, including the Boston Fire Department, 
Boston Emergency Medical Services, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, 
                                                 
52 Oren Dorell, “Mosque that Boston Suspects Attended Has Radical Ties,” USA Today, April 23, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/23/boston-mosque-radicals/2101411/. 
53 Nick DeLuca, “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Attributed His 1.094 GPA to Chechen-Russian Relations,” 
Bostinno, March 25, 2015, https://www.americaninno.com/boston/boston-bombing-evidence-dzhokhar-
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and Boston Regional Intelligence Center. The public safety infrastructure, 
operating under a unified command structure, was in place and operating by 
7 a.m. The race began at 9 a.m. in the town of Hopkinton, Massachusetts. 
In total, 50 agencies comprised the interagency public safety team 
supporting the marathon. By 11 a.m., an estimated 27,000 runners were 
running the marathon. The concurrent Boston Red Sox season opener began 
at 11:05 a.m.; nearly an hour and a half later, the elite marathon runners 
completed the 26.2-mile race. The Red Sox game ended at 2:08 p.m. 
Spectators filled the streets and Kenmore Square, located near Fenway Park 
along the final stretch of the marathon route, cheering the remaining runners 
on to the finish line.54 At 2:49 p.m., 41 minutes after the Red Sox game 
ended, the first bomb detonated near the finish line. Thirteen seconds later, 
the second bomb detonated less than 200 yards from the site of the initial 
explosion. Three people lost their lives, and 180 were injured—some 
maimed for life. 
While local state and federal law enforcement began investigating these explosions 
and area hospitals were taking in the injured, Tamerlan Tsarnaev returned to his home and 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev returned to his dorm room on campus at UMass Dartmouth. At 5:04 
p.m., Dzhokhar Tweeted, “Ain’t no love in the heart of the city, stay safe people” (Figure 
2).55  
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Laboratories, 2016, http://www.abbott.com/marathon/boston-or-bust.html. 
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Figure 2. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s Tweet on April 15, 201356 
6. On April 18, 2013, three days after the marathon attack, the FBI provided 
an update on their investigation and released photographs of the suspects: 
Tamerlan, “black hat,” and Dzhokhar, “white hat.” In an appeal for the 
public’s help in identifying them. The FBI’s tip line is inundated with calls. 
Five hours later and still not identified, he Tsarnaev brothers walk onto the 
MIT campus and kill officer Dean Collier. 
Now that the FBI had distributed images of the brothers nationwide, through local 
and national news and social media, the Tsarnaev brothers feared someone would 
recognize them and call the FBI. They armed themselves with guns and bombs and decided 
to leave the Boston area to elude capture. Prior to leaving, the Tsarnaev brothers robbed a 
convenience store not far from the MIT campus at around 10:28 p.m., putting them in 
walking distance of officer Sean Collier, who was carrying out his work responsibilities 
that evening. Although the MIT Police Department received information from and 
contributed information to the JTTF, those efforts did not prevent Officer Sean Collier of 
the MIT Police Department from being shot and killed while seated in his patrol car on 
campus in an ambush-style attack by the Tsarnaev brothers on Thursday, April 18, at 10:31 
p.m., three days after the bombing.57 His assassination was witnessed by an MIT 
mathematics Ph.D. candidate riding a bike on campus.58  
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B. CHOKEPOINTS 
My research and analysis using open-source news reports, after action reports 
prepared by state and federal agencies, and information derived from congressional 
hearings and reports have uncovered three chokepoints in the timeline, which together 
represent opportunities to have possibly interceded and prevented some or all the events 
surrounding the Tsarnaev brothers’ attacks. This analysis was conducted only with 
chokepoints with a direct nexus to campus police. See timelines #1, #4, and #6 in Section 
A of this chapter.  
1. The Comment Interview 
In 2009, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was interviewed by Johannes Hirn, a student reporter 
at BU, about his amateur boxing career for a photo essay titled “Will Box for Passport.” 
Hirn was a writer for The Comment, a BU graduate magazine. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was a 
student at Bunker Hill Community College for three semesters—fall 2006, spring 2007, 
and fall 2008.59 Tsarnaev made ambivalent statements about assimilation to American life 
in the interview. Tamerlan Tsarnaev said, “I don’t have a single American friend, I don’t 
understand them,” describing his difficulty adapting to American life, despite his 
attendance at Bunker Hill Community College in Boston. Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s statement 
to Hirn was not actionable; it did not contain a threat of any kind. However, given the 
context of the emerging threat picture, his statements were concerning.  
a. Alternative State 
The campus police Task Force Officer (TFO) assigned to the Boston FBI Joint 
Terrorism Task Force regularly receives analyzed and packaged intelligence products, 
developed by interagency personnel from relevant open sources. Campus police TFOs 
maintain a connection to their campuses while developing a broader network in the 
communities within their jurisdiction. Part of the FBI’s counterterrorism mission entails an 
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bomb_suspect_tamerlan_tsarnaev.html. 
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effort to “identify and disrupt” terrorism plots; therefore, campus police and Boston Police 
TFOs are in regular contact with leaders of the local Islamic centers and are familiar with 
the Muslim Student Association Leadership and Islamic campus centers. Following the 
publication of “Will Box for Passport,” TFOs—in addition to pushing a copy directly to 
the Boston JTTF—contact the Islamic Center leaders to make them aware of the article 
and recommend reaching out to Tamerlan.  
TFOs have access to FBI data resources, including the eGuardian system that 
provides a common site and universal access to “thousands of law enforcement personnel 
and analysts directly supporting law enforcement.”60 The TFOs also have access to 
suspicious activity reports (SAR). Access to SARs information and the eGuardian 
reporting system, which includes legacy reports, creates a robust picture. These two 
systems enable cross-jurisdictional collecting and sharing of information about terrorism-
related activities by campus police, members of various law enforcement agencies, and 
others. A campus police TFO initiates a new entry into the system documenting their 
outreach and intervention efforts at the local Islamic center leadership based upon 
Tamerlan’s account in The Comment.61  
b. Alternative Outcome  
The campus police TFO learns of the magazine article “Will Box for Passport” and 
shares it with the JTTF and TFOs from the Boston Police. The FBI links it to the State 
Department and ICE databases and takes another look at Tsarnaev. TFOs connect with 
Islamic leaders to suggest an intervention based on his Tsarnaev comments. The campus 
TFO’s initial outreach establishes a sense of familiarity and trust between the Islamic 
Center and the campus TFO. The Islamic Center reports back to the campus TFO that 
Tamerlan was loud and argumentative toward the religious leadership when discussing 
slain civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In turn, the campus TFO then shares 
this new information with others, including the Boston Police TFOs. The information 
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received from the Islamic Center leadership is entered into eGuardian, which leads to 
additional data points and results in stronger profile development to the benefit of the JTTF, 
the Boston Police, and other federal agencies that now have Tamerlan on their radar as a 
person of concern. The Boston JTTF reviews the initial assessment of Tamerlan with this 
added information and determines a preliminary investigation is warranted. Knowing that 
he is on the FBI’s radar, he abandons his plot to commit the bombing. 
2. Academic Concerns at UMass Dartmouth  
In January 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is placed on academic probation at UMass 
Dartmouth; he submits an appeal to the university after learning he is in jeopardy of losing 
financial aid. In his appeal, he writes he has “lost too many loved relatives” and that his 
“relatives live in Chechnya, Russia” (Figure 1).62 Dzhokhar’s self-reported background, 
circumstances, and possible traumatization are concerning. Arguably, the content of 
Dzhokhar’s appeal is unusual.  
a. Alternative State 
The substance and tone of Dzhokhar’s appeal—his despairing reports of violence, 
chaos, and crisis among family in a heavily radicalized part of the world—raise a red flag 
among those on the financial aid committee. They notify and share the appeal letter with 
the UMass Dartmouth mental health and crisis team now represented on the campus threat 
assessment team. Based on the referral from the mental health and crisis team, the campus 
threat assessment team deploys its resources and experts to engage and assess Dzhokhar. 
They interview him; the mental health team members recommend (and provide campus 
resources for) culturally appropriate mental health and academic support services. The 
Dean of Student Affairs Office contacts Dzhokhar’s mother, who is now aware of the 
situation and the stressors impacting her son’s academic progress. Campus public safety 
members, as participants in the threat assessment process, learn that Dzhokhar is also a 
heavy marijuana user and make their campus police aware.  
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The TFO, while attending an investigative briefing at the department, learns of 
Dzhokhar’s heavy marijuana use and how the information came to light (his appeal to 
student financial aid). The TFO shares this information with his task force supervisor and 
makes an entry into the eGuardian system created to enable the sharing of suspicious 
activity reports and other terrorism-related activities nationwide. When entering 
information about Dzhokhar Tsarnaev into the system, the TFO learns of an entry for 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev and discovers that they are brothers, which prompts the JTTF once 
again to revisit, and now expand, its scrutiny of the Tsarnaevs.  
b. Alternative Outcome 
The campus police TFO shares information about Dzhokhar with the Boston Police, 
JTTF, and TFOs. Dzhokhar is on the radar of the campus threat assessment team as a 
student of concern. His class attendance, academic performance, and behavior are 
monitored by student affairs officials. Each of his professors provides a weekly email 
update describing his attendance, conduct, any conversations they had with him, the 
context of the conversation(s), and information relevant to his academic progress or lack 
thereof. He has weekly appointments with a counselor at campus mental health services. 
Dzhokhar’s well-being is closely examined on campus, thus enabling campus officials to 
develop a baseline of normalcy and allowing them to determine signs of stress or 
abnormality. Close scrutiny of Dzhokhar provides opportunities for immediate intervention 
by the institution. And again, pull it all out to the plausible conclusions. For whatever 
reason, because of change of heart or the knowledge that he is heavily surveilled, who 
knows why, he does not allow his brother to recruit him. Or maybe he does, but the 
authorities find out and arrest Tamerlan for the plot. Either way, the timeline stops.  
3. Identifying the Bombers 
On April 15, 2013, at approximately 5:20 p.m., the FBI holds a press conference 
and releases photo arrays of the two as-yet unidentified bombing suspects.63 In an appeal 
                                                 
63 State of Massachusetts, After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon 
Bombings, December 2014, https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/09/uz/after-action-report-for-the-
response-to-the-2013-boston-marathon-bombings.pdf. 
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for the public’s help in identifying them, Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers 
tells reporters, “Somebody out there knows these individuals.”64 The FBI’s tip line is 
inundated with calls and the agency receives several thousand additional leads comprising 
of video and photos. The quantity of leads “almost became a management problem, there 
was so much of it.”65 Some five hours later and still not identified by public safety or law 
enforcement officers, the Tsarnaev brothers walk onto the MIT campus.66 The FBI is 
known for commandeering structures and other assets during an emergency. Despite the 
campus infrastructure in Boston (existence of campus email and emergency text messages 
to communicate information in emergencies), the FBI did not utilize any of it to 
communicate.  
a. Alternative State  
The participation of campus TFOs on the JTTF during the course of the 
investigation gives TFOs direct access to the Boston Police and others as well as grants the 
JTTF access to Greater Boston campuses, all affected in some way by the Boston Marathon 
bombing. Campus police officers and other investigators assigned to the JTTF receive 
images of suspect number 1 (black hat) and suspect number 2 (white hat) at the same time 
the public receives the information. All begin to check in with their sources to identify the 
suspects. Campus TFOs, after viewing the images and noting the possible ages of both, 
assume they are or could have been enrolled at or work for a Boston-area college or 
university. The campus officers provide the images to the heads of the campus police and 
security departments in Greater Boston with a request that the images be spread broadly 
via campus communications channels (email, smartphone Safety App, and text message). 
Campus police, campus security, and all campus community members receive the images 
                                                 
64 Cindy Boren, “Boston Marathon Explosions: Day 4,” Washington Post, April 18, 2013, 
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of the suspects within 30 minutes. UMass Dartmouth police begin to receive information 
that one of the suspects (white hat) is a student there.  
This information triggers a cascade of actions enabling the JTTF to tap immediately 
into the campus public safety network. The TFO quickly directs campus police to compare 
the image to Dzhokhar’s campus identification card and sends this information to the 
Boston FBI. The TFO also requests campus police flag his ID card, thus enabling the police 
to monitor his movements (those locations into which he swipes his card) and check 
Dzhokhar’s card access history to see if he has swiped into any campus buildings recently. 
They also begin aligning his card access history with campus video cameras to see if they 
can locate him anywhere near those locations where he swiped in most recently. Searching 
and aligning campus video also enables campus police to convert recent video into digital 
images to be shared with the FBI. The images provide a clothing description. Campus 
police also confer with campus IT support to see if Dzhokhar is currently logged into the 
Wi-Fi network, which would indicate he is on or near campus. They check with campus 
parking to see if he owns any vehicles and, if so, where he has parking privileges. Campus 
police begin to review biographical information about Dzhokhar and the police chief 
recalls his name being mentioned in a threat assessment team meeting in January.  
b. Alternative Outcome  
On April 15, 2013, as the FBI begins its press conference, it simultaneously releases 
the suspects’ photos via social media and asks that area campuses do so as well. In an 
appeal for the public’s help in identifying the suspects, Special Agent in Charge 
DesLauriers tells reporters, “Somebody out there knows these individuals” and then 
specifies the importance of a whole-community approach in identifying them. DesLauriers 
recognizes the geographical footprint of college campuses in Boston and calls upon that 
higher education community during the press conference, asking them to circulate the 
photos within their campus networks utilizing their internal media for communication. The 
FBI’s tip line is inundated with calls, as are the cell phones of the campus TFOs and Boston 
Police TFOs. The police TFOs’ connections to the campus community network and Boston 
area Islamic community prove to be extremely valuable. The Tsarnaevs are identified early, 
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and an alert to all police is issued throughout the Boston area. The MIT police are notified 
that the suspects were sighted near their campus. In addition to informing their police 
officers, the MIT police issue a Public Safety Advisory advising the MIT campus 
community that they have reports of the suspects being seen near campus. The advisory 
instructs campus members to use caution, limit their movements, and to contact campus 
police if they have information or have seen the suspects. There is now a heightened sense 
of awareness and anxiety at MIT. Neighboring colleges take note, sharing the MIT Public 
Safety Advisory with their campus community via email and text message. The media 
reports on these campus notices and, thus, the opportunities for the Tsarnaev brothers to 
traverse the MIT campus and other campus areas undetected are significantly reduced. 
Collier is warned. He is out of his vehicle patrolling on foot and positioned to see the faces 
of passersby on campus. His situational awareness and subsequent behaviors reduce the 
opportunity for anyone to approach him without being detected, and he does not die.  
After the bombing, both Tsarnaevs are captured, whether dead or alive, within 
hours, saving the city from the nightmare of the marathon bombing and the tragic loss of 
life and serious injuries that resulted. Boston area campus police and campus leadership 
are appreciative of the FBI’s diligence and inclusivity in the press briefing. They recognize 
the value of campus police partnerships with the FBI. 
C. COUNTERFACTUAL SUMMARY 
Evaluating the Boston Marathon bombing counterfactually at three distinct 
chokepoints juxtaposed against campus police participation in JTTF created opportunities 
for me to assess opportunities to intercede and possibly prevent the bombing, or expedite 
the identification and capture of the brothers before any additional loss of life. As stated in 
Chapter I, the Boston Marathon bombing did not happen on a college campus. However, 
CFA of the bombing provides campus police leaders, campus administrators, and the FBI 
a lens into assessing the potential value of including campus police in FBI JTTFs. 
Counterfactual analysis also allowed me to evaluate campus populations, campus 
jurisdictions, campus public safety capabilities, and campus public safety personnel. 
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It is impossible to say with any certainty that key actions and behaviors related to 
campus police involvement in JTTFs would have prevented the attack or expedited the 
capture of the Tsarnaev brothers. Having assessed three chokepoints in the timeline, I 
believe that campus police involvement in JTTFs can provide a myriad of opportunities for 
the FBI and campus police. Essentially, assigning a campus police TFO to a JTTF connects 
two diametrically opposite environments (higher education and federal law enforcement), 
strengthens campuses’ ability to prevent and detect terrorism, and strengthens the FBI’s 
ability to carry out its counterterrorism mission.  
D. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following are recommendations for policing strategies inspired by the events in 
Boston Marathon bombing for the FBI, campus police leaders, and campus administrators. 
Key practices and lessons learned through researching community policing and college 
campuses, JTTFs, and the relationship of university campuses to Homeland Security at 
three separate chokepoints have yielded the following recommendations.  
(1) Recommendation #1: FBI Field Offices Should Prioritize Recruitment of 
Campus Police TFOs 
The value of increased cooperation and campus police participation in the JTTFs 
can help campuses remain abreast of potential terrorist activities. Campus police TFOs can 
also strengthen the JTTFs and provide invaluable training for the TFOs. As a first step, I 
recommend the FBI field offices identify armed and commissioned campus police 
departments in their state. The FBI should compile a list of campus police departments that 
have TFOs assigned and discuss the benefits of participation to those that do not.  
(2) Recommendation #2: Campus Administrators Should Consider a 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Institution and the JTTF to 
Clarify the Role of a Campus Police TFO 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s note to campus officials appealing his academic 
suspension—fearing he would lose financial aid—underscores the roles of campus police 
and campus administration in applying a multidisciplinary approach to managing students 
in crisis. If the threat assessment team had met to discuss Dzhokhar following submission 
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of his appeal, the meeting may have created an opportunity for intercession. 
Communications and collaboration among key internal campus stakeholders around 
student wellness issues is important. For example, campus stakeholders such as deans, 
faculty, cultural advisors, public safety, campus housing, athletic coaches, and healthcare 
professionals are most often in the best position to assess, gather, and share information 
related to students in distress. Campus Behavioral Threat Assessment Team information is 
most often confidential unless a community threat exists, requiring the skillful, 
collaborative intervention by campus police, campus administrators, or healthcare 
professionals. At the time Dzhokhar wrote the letter, nothing suggested he posed a danger 
to himself or others. At this point, Dzhokhar is not in any way a person of concern for the 
UMass Dartmouth police or any other policing agency leading up to the Boston Marathon 
attack.  
Furthermore, having spent over two decades in higher education public safety and 
almost a decade in senior leadership, I can say with a high degree of certainty that campus 
administrators would not support campus police facilitating the usage of a student in 
distress as an FBI source. A memorandum of understanding between the JTTF and the 
campus institution would help clarify the role of the TFO. I recommend the FBI research 
the Portland Police Bureau’s decision to leave the JTTF and rejoin following the 
development of a memorandum of understanding because this could very well be a best 
practice. The FBI should expect campus administrators to weigh the balance between 
national security and civil liberties in deciding to assign a TFO. Offering to enter into a 
memorandum of understanding may assuage any concerns campus administrators have.  
(3) Recommendation #3: Campus Police Should Ensure Programs and 
Initiatives to Support Both Ethnic and Marginalized Students Are in Place 
and Active 
My analysis of the facts and circumstances learned through CFA of Chokepoint 1 
did not reveal any information to suggest that participation of UMass Dartmouth police or 
MIT police in the Boston JTTF could have impacted Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s actions at this 
point. Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s statements during his interview with The Comment created an 
opportunity for community-minded police officers and others in the Boston area to 
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intervene and assist Tamerlan in adjusting to life in America. If community-minded police 
officers had intervened, by way of referring Tamerlan to a program or reaching out to 
develop a rapport with him, Tamerlan may have found assimilation to American life easier 
and might not have become radicalized. A retrospective look at the seemingly innocuous 
statements Tamerlan made suggests a deep personal struggle. That same struggle could 
possibly exist among other similarly situated Muslims in Western society—whether 
enrolled in college or not. I recommend campus administrators work collaboratively within 
their campus community, with external stakeholders like their local police department, and 
with mosques and cultural centers to ensure ethnic-minority students can access resources 
to both support their inclusivity on and off campus and support them in upholding their 
traditions. The literature is replete with examples of campus police building and 
maintaining relationships with traditionally marginalized communities adding instant value 
to campus policing efforts. Campus police can assist their institutions in bridging the gap 
between the institution and marginalized communities by ensuring their community 
policing strategies include outreach to and support of ethnic students and by assigning 
liaisons to cultural centers that involve the promotion and preservation of culture.  
(4) Recommendation #4: The FBI Should Leverage the Emergency 
Communication Networks of Local Campuses 
The CFA at Chokepoint 3 revealed an opportunity for the Boston FBI JTTF to 
involve campus police and campus administrators in a whole-community approach to learn 
the identity of the two men. As full JTTF members, campus police TFOs are involved in 
the investigation and are expected to provide insight and access to their respective 
networks. Given the apparent age of the men in the photos (college-aged), it is reasonable 
to believe campus police TFOs would suggest FBI leadership appeal to campus 
administrators on an institutional level—asking them to share the photographs within their 
campus networks using campus communication media. Additionally, it is further 
conceivable that campus police TFOs would appeal to Boston area campus police chiefs 
on a collegial level, asking them to distribute the photos in the same manner through 
campus public safety networks. Faculty, staff, and students would have those images on 
their phones and computers courtesy of the institution or campus safety. 
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(5) Recommendation #5: The FBI Should Reestablish the National Security 
Higher Education Advisory Board 
As each alternative state and alternative outcome in this counterfactual 
demonstrates, the need for collaboration and innovation is imperative. The FBI is in a 
position to convene the higher education community and other federal agencies around 
national security issues related to the higher education community. Opportunities for 
information sharing between the FBI and campuses, focus and review of campus police 
outreach and engagement programs in light of emerging threats, and engagement of 
campus administrators were revealed during this CFA. Following 9/11, the National 
Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB) served as a forum for discussing 
national security issues related to higher education and the work of federal agencies such 
as the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Office of National Intelligence, and 
the Department of Defense. Reconvening the NSHEAB creates a unity of effort around 
key national security issues. I believe the NSHEAB created a substructure necessary for 
security concerns to be raised by the higher education community and its absence presents 
a significant gap in information sharing between the higher education community and the 
federal government.  
E. COUNTERFACTUAL CONCLUSION 
This thesis began with the question: “What does a CFA of the Boston Marathon 
bombing reveal about the potential value of campus police inclusion in FBI JTTFs?” A 
CFA of the 2013 Boston Marathon attack at three distinct chokepoints in the timeline 
demonstrated key opportunities for campus police TFOs to have participated in interceding 
and possibly preventing some or all of the events surrounding the Tsarnaev brothers’ 
attacks. These include chokepoint #1: placing Tamerlan Tsarnaev on the radar of the JTTF 
following a 2010 interview in a graduate student magazine of Boston University; 
chokepoint #4: bringing Dzhokhar Tsarnaev to the attention of a university threat 
assessment team after he is placed on academic probation; and chokepoint #6: expediting 
the identification and capture of the Tsarnaev brothers following the release of photographs 
by the FBI.  
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The CFA at chokepoint #1 suggests campus police participation as TFOs in the 
Boston FBI JTTF would not have aided in placing Tamerlan Tsarnaev on the radar of the 
FBI sooner. The CFA at chokepoint #4 did not reveal evidence to suggest that Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev’s note appealing his academic suspension would have triggered a chain of notices 
leading to him being reported to the Boston FBI JTTF. An analysis at chokepoint #6, 
however, suggests that the FBI harnessing the communication networks of Boston area 
campuses with the assistance of campus police TFOs may have supported the earlier 
identification of the Tsarnaev brothers, thus leading to a capture more quickly. I believe an 
opportunity exists for JTTFs to leverage the relationships campus police TFOs have with 
campus communication networks in times of crisis. At the same time, it is imperative that 
there be links with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies that may not be as 
familiar with practices on today’s college campuses, including emergency notification 
systems and email and text messages. It is incumbent for college campus police and public 
safety officials to provide these law enforcement agencies at all levels with education that 
goes beyond making them apprised of simply the professionalism and capability of the 
campus police organization. Rather, a broader campus context that speaks to proactive 
infrastructures must be shared, in addition to information about practices used in a reactive 
mode after a threat, incident, or crisis. Comprehensive planning with partners extending 
beyond the university community is essential and discussed with specific examples in 
Chapter III, including the nexus of college campuses with counterterrorism as well as 
assessment and problem-solving tactics. The unity of effort that results from collaborative 
policing is discussed in Chapter IV, pointing to the importance of furthering key alliances 
between Institutes of Higher Education and the broader law enforcement and Homeland 
Security community. In particular, this extends the value of the CFA to deepening 
relationships between campus police and JTTFs and building them where they are not 
already in existence in order to improve proactive assessment and possible prevention of 
campus threats. This is especially prescient given recognition at the federal level (former 
FBI director Robert Mueller describing the mission to close the gaps between the 
intelligence community and academia with respect to national security issues) and in light 
of current threats of Chinese espionage and theft of research on college campuses as noted 
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by current FBI Director Christopher Wray. Understanding the lessons of the CFA requires 
careful analysis and discussion on the uniqueness of campus policing and the campus 
environment. Campus police leaders are expected to be knowledgeable, skillful, and 
committed to their own campuses, in addition to being an institutional resource for 
collaboration with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. I am unaware of any 
similar expectation for local, state, and federal law enforcement agency that faces the range 
of threats as do campuses and campus police leaders. This is especially significant for those 
leaders of federal law enforcement agencies and field offices with campus research 
institutions conducting government-funded or groundbreaking research within their 
geographical area. To increase understanding and awareness across the spectrum of law 
enforcement, I recommend state and federal law enforcement leaders experience some 
training and professional development in the role of campus police, campus police leaders, 
and the contemporary challenges facing campuses. A unity of effort must also continue 
and be supported through communities of practice as college campuses further develop 
their blueprint for contemporary campus policing in an environment of terrorist threats, 
strengthen their key alliances and collaborative partnerships, and consistently fortify their 
best practices.  
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III. COMMUNITY POLICING AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES 
Community policing on a college campus can take on many forms, similar to how 
community policing is applied by municipal police in an urban community versus a 
suburban community. Similarly, whether the campus is suburban or urban or at a private 
or state university, the principles of community policing are relevant and should form the 
framework of the department’s community policing strategy. A campus community 
policing strategy must consider (1) community engagement and partnerships and the health 
of those strategic relationships and mechanisms for information sharing and reporting; (2) 
problem solving and prevention along with the adequacy of their resources; (3) 
organizational development and change as well as the readiness of campus leadership to 
understand the potential problems in order to address the full spectrum of potential threats 
to their campuses; and (4) analysis, measurement, and evaluation, which are essential for 
understanding and improving performance outcomes. This chapter describes community 
policing on campuses, the challenges campus police leaders face, and the nexus between 
threats to the homeland and to college campuses.  
A. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS 
Each college or university employs a range of police or security services charged 
with ensuring the safety of their campuses—whether the officers are contracted, unarmed 
security guards employed by the institution or armed sworn police officers or a hybrid. In 
2011–2012, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a survey of campus law enforcement 
officials on 905 four-year colleges and universities characterized as traditional institutions. 
The results showed that three-quarters of these institutions employ sworn officers who have 
police academy training background and who can make arrests.67 Campuses with sworn 
police officers are well suited to engage with state, local, and federal law enforcement in 
training, investigations, and confidential briefings. Each of these activities is critically 
necessary to address campus crimes ranging from burglary, larceny, and robbery to sexual 
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assault. In other words, responding to calls for service—routine or emergency—is a core 
function of any campus police or public safety agency and one of the more concrete 
“outputs” of policing.68 Thus, appropriate training, properly conducted investigations, and 
timely and confidential briefings are imperative to thwart campus threats, targeted campus 
violence (including active shooters), and homegrown violent extremism.  
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Services 
Toolkit for Policing report, community “members’ willingness to collaborate with the 
police depends on the community members’ belief that their actions reflect community 
values.”69 The toolkit does not specifically mention campus police leaders or campus 
policing; however, the precepts described are intended to assist police leaders in promoting 
trust and legitimacy in their agencies. According to Yale Law professor Tom Tyler, 
“legitimacy reflects the belief that the police ought to be allowed to exercise their authority 
to maintain social order, manage conflicts and solve problems in their communities.”70 
This is especially important for campus police in areas where crime and opportunities for 
crime are more prevalent. In a campus environment, campus police can coordinate with 
key internal departments such as student affairs, athletics, student health, environmental 
health and safety, risk management, parking and transit, and administrative services; all 
can be integral to the success of the public safety department. Campus police should also 
coordinate with fraternities, sororities, cultural organizations, and victim advocacy groups. 
The ability of campus police to serve the community in a manner that reflects community 
values enhances how they are perceived as legitimate authority figures on campus. 
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Visibility and engagement can be fundamental to the success of a campus patrol strategy 
and should include police on foot or bicycle to increase exposure and allow for meaningful 
engagement. As stated in the Department of Justice’s Community Relations Services 
Toolkit for Policing, “Strong relationships of mutual trust between police agencies and the 
communities they serve are critical to maintaining public safety and effective policing.”71 
As outlined in the 2014 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) report, “This 
process [of trust] must begin at the executive level but should be implemented department-
wide” by department leadership.72 Therefore, the professional profile, community 
engagement, and accessibility of the department leadership is not enough to settle a 
campus’s expectation of legitimacy within their police department. The actions of all 
members at each level of the department should reflect community values, and this begins 
with the department leadership.  
The National Center for Campus Safety recommends the COPS report to campus 
police leaders as a guide in establishing clear policies, protocols, and communication 
practices among all stakeholders to help foster collaboration.73 Clear procedures, policies, 
protocols, and means of communication among stakeholders are core elements of best 
practices in place within all levels of a department. Liaison officers can be instrumental in 
cross-departmental coordination, convening a campus public safety advisory committee 
and providing quarterly campus safety briefs to departments. Likewise, campus police can 
extend the value of collaboration by urging department representatives to participate on 
committees and task forces convened by these groups. All of these initiatives can help to 
ensure campus police departments are successful in managing relationships with internal 
departments.  
                                                 
71 U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Services Toolkit for Policing, “Importance of 
Police-Community Relationships.”  
72 Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing Defined (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice), 2014, https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p157-pub.pdf. 
73 “Building and Maintaining Successful Community Relations,” The National Center for Campus 




Some campus police leaders must consider their popularity and accessibility to the 
general public as well as the quasi-public nature of their facilities. A 2014 COPS 
publication describes a community as “assets such as people and institutions, schools and 
hospitals, businesses, land.”74 Many campuses have theaters, museums, art galleries, bars, 
and restaurants, forums for talks, and athletic venues that attract the general public as well 
as the campus community. Most talks are offered free on campuses and many are open to 
the public. The affordability of campus museums and galleries and the popularity of the 
sports teams and nearby bars and restaurants are all considerations campus safety leaders 
should factor into their patrol strategies to ensure they have adequate personnel on duty, 
especially during peak hours. Some campuses have extensive library collections and their 
libraries can serve as places where non-campus community members can access computers 
and have a quiet place to read or study. Libraries must make government publications 
available for public access in their facilities; thus, campus police leaders should consider 
the need for their staff to contribute to fostering an open, inviting campus environment 
through their visibility and engaging nature of their staff while on patrol.75 Quasi-public 
campus venues, campus police, and security are also major touch points for an institution 
and contribute to the community’s attitude toward the institution.  
Campus community members (faculty, staff, and students) must be willing to 
partner with campus public safety to support overall campus safety; in other words, co-
production.76 College-aged students arrive on campus from a variety of places, with 
different backgrounds and diverse experiences. While there may arguably be benefits to 
campus public safety officials extending invitations to students for pizza in order to discuss 
campus safety and security, this action alone would likely fall short. This strategy of 
partnering with students is discussed in an article appearing in the International Review of 
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Administrative Sciences, The Co-production of Campus Safety and Security: A Case Study 
at the University of Georgia.77 Campus police community engagement initiatives should 
be developed based on community needs and input. Partnering with campus community 
groups enables campus police to learn of issues and respond before the issues become a 
bigger problem. Inviting students, faculty, and community stakeholders alike “has become 
the de facto mandate” for police, according to John G. Reece, Ph.D., Colorado Mesa 
University, and Judy Macy, Chief of Police, Fruita, Colorado, Police Department in their 
co-authored work, Citizen Advisory Boards in Contemporary Practice.78 Reece and Macy 
determined that these programs must be evaluated annually to assess how effectively they 
meet goals designed to prevent and reduce crime, further develop relationships, and share 
information.79 When campus community members serve in an advisory capacity on a 
board or committee, their voices and viewpoints help enhance understanding and 
cooperation between the campus community and campus safety department. Although 
campus police and security play a major role in the prevention of crime, they cannot 
effectively do the job alone.  
A number of practices allow partnerships to bring value to the campus community 
and the community-at-large. One of the conclusions reached in a study of Campus-
Community Policing Partnerships (CCPP) at Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
authored by the COPS office of the U.S. Department of Justice was that campus community 
policing partnerships “promoted safe living and increased community awareness of safety 
through community interaction with law enforcement officers.”80 Although this study by 
the COPS office focused on three colleges, it provided meaningful, innovative approaches 
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to community policing on campuses, an area not often studied by the federal government. 
Campus police partnerships could include speaking to campus groups on crime prevention 
topics, recent trends, and police or security initiatives. They could also include aligning 
community outreach strategies with international student populations on campuses by 
assigning liaisons to cultural centers and instituting citizen police academies. Campuses 
can also provide cultural awareness training to staff members and foster other activities 
geared toward developing familiarity with international students. Tailoring the delivery of 
police services, staff recruitment, training, and professional development are all initiatives 
to consider when developing a campus community policing strategy responsive to 
contemporary challenges. 
B. PROBLEM SOLVING AND PREVENTION 
A safe and secure campus environment is integral to helping a college or university 
achieve its mission and the police play an integral role on college campuses. Professor 
Herman Goldstein’s book, Problem Oriented Policing, hypothesized that “police would be 
more effective in their work if they were more proactive in their efforts to understand and 
control crime rather than just responding to crimes after they have occurred.”81 Goldstein’s 
work was not specific to college campuses or campus police leaders; however, his work 
has been studied and adopted across the spectrum of police departments both nationally 
and internationally.82 A campus setting provides an ideal environment for campus police 
to identify problems and implement solutions tailored for their campus. The first step in 
problem solving and prevention is developing systems and practices to identify 
problems.83 
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More than 125 years have passed since the formation of the oldest campus police 
department in the United States at Yale University in 1894.84 Its establishment predated 
the federal government’s recognition of the need to regulate campuses and campus public 
safety. Yale University and the city of New Haven’s decision to appoint New Haven police 
officers to patrol the campus can arguably been seen as one of the earliest examples of 
problem solving well before Goldstein’s work. Ninety-two years later, in 1986, the murder 
and rape of Jeanne Clery on the Lehigh University campus and the massacre of more than 
30 people at Virginia Tech 21 years later in 2007 galvanized the federal government to 
institute measures to regulate and ensure campus safety.85 Recognizing the vulnerability 
and complexity of college campuses, the Jeanne Clery Act was established to “provide 
transparency around campus crime policy and statistics.”86 After Jeanne Clery was 
murdered in her dorm room, her parents alleged Lehigh University had a “rapidly 
escalating crime rate which they didn’t tell anybody about.”87 There was no requirement 
to report crime statistics about campus crime or crime near campus prior to the enactment 
of the Clery Act. The Clery Act requires campuses to identify, collect, and publish crime 
statistics on or near campus, thus enabling problem solving and prevention, especially in 
the face of rising crime.  
The Clery Act has several required components intended to make crime incidents 
on or near campus transparent to the public. One component of the Clery Act directly 
related to a campus’s crime prevention efforts requires campuses “to provide, and describe 
in their annual security reports, ongoing prevention and awareness campaigns for students 
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and employees.”88 This requirement ensures campuses have programs in place as an 
institutional responsibility. All campuses must publish and maintain a daily crime log, 
usually managed by campus police or security. Crime logs are intended to keep the 
community informed of crimes on a day-to-day basis and must be accessible to the public. 
The Clery Act also requires that campus police leaders disclose campus crime statistics and 
security policy summaries in their annual security report (ASR), published in October of 
each year. An ASR must be made available to the public, potential students, and 
employees.89 Disclosing crime statistics, maintaining a daily crime log, and publishing 
policy summaries provides transparency as to the types of crimes recorded on and around 
campus while describing the policies and programs in place to address the crime.90 An 
ASR provides information on how campus departments collaborate to address complex 
matters such as sexual assault, harassment, and stalking, areas of tremendous focus due to 
their prevalence on college campuses. An ASR must use federally mandated definitions 
concerning the locations and types of crimes to allow for comparisons across campuses; 
however, terrorism is not a required category according to the U.S. Department of 
Education, Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting.91 
Timely warnings and crime notification, also mandated by the Clery Act, provide 
institutional transparency. Whenever a crime occurs that meets the threshold for a “timely 
warning,” campus safety leaders are required to notify the entire campus community via 
email.92 An email informing the campus of the crime, its location, and the time it occurred 
improves community members’ situational awareness regarding their own safety. Such 
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emails ensure that the campus remains informed and that community members have access 
to the information and resources they deserve. To provide the campus community with 
timely information about certain crimes, campus safety leaders and police administrations 
must have adequate systems and processes in place. For more imminent dangers, such as 
an active shooter, an emergency notification email and text message communications 
protocol should be used by campus safety officials in reaching out to all campus members. 
The Clery Act was expanded in 2008 to include emergency notifications as an institutional 
requirement.93 Such communication will help campus safety officials in their efforts to 
ensure campus safety.94 Preventing and reducing crime are institutional responsibilities on 
college campuses. Increased and timely notifications and access to information about 
crimes and the policies in place to address crime enable campus police representatives to 
identify at-risk areas, thus enhancing the potential value of preventative measures.  
A preventative measure recommended by the U.S. Department of Education is the 
use of multidisciplinary threat assessment teams.95 Threat assessment teams are a best 
practice and facilitate a team approach in response to student behaviors that may be 
escalating and causing concern or risk to others.96 Although the existence of a campus 
threat assessment team is not required by federal law, states such as Virginia and 
Connecticut require colleges and universities to have a threat assessment team in place.97 
Typically, threat assessment teams consist of the heads of campus safety, student affairs, 
and mental health; a legal representative; an academic affairs representative; and a 
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university administration representative representing a unity of effort to coordinate and 
manage very complex and important work. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 
The focus on increasing communication between the campus community and 
campus police representatives through new organizational strategies can contribute to 
heightened awareness of campus needs and communication among all community 
stakeholders. When these channels of communication are open, greater collaboration and 
sharing of information is more likely, thus contributing to improved safety overall. The 
organization of campus police departments should, accordingly, be based on the services, 
needs, and capabilities of the campus community.98 This is analogous to a local 
government considering the unique aspects of their respective communities. 
Understanding the makeup of a campus community is paramount in navigating 
conversations and advancing a culture of cohesion and trust between campus 
administration, the police, and the other key campus offices. For example, according to the 
Pew Research Center, the population of the United States includes just over three million 
Muslims as of 2015, roughly 1 percent of the country’s entire population.99 However, in 
Michigan, the Muslim population represents 2.75 percent of the overall state at nearly 
274,000 members.100 In a 2018 thesis by Joseph Murray at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
titled The Challenges Associated with Providing Efficient and Effective Fire Services to 
Large Arab-American Populations and the Resources Required to Meet Them, Murray 
posited that “the city of Dearborn, Michigan, hosts one of the largest Arab-American 
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populations outside the Middle East.”101 To better serve Arab-Americans and Middle 
Eastern communities, public safety (police, fire, and emergency medical services) must 
work to build bridges to such communities as the fire services team in Dearborn has done. 
This is particularly important because there has been a 23.6 percent increase in reported 
hate crimes in Michigan—from 309 to 399—according to Karam.102 And while a direct 
connection between increases in hate crime and the Muslim population in Michigan has 
not been drawn, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for Michigan is leading two initiatives that 
reflect a commitment and adaptation to the state’s increase in Muslims and hate crimes. 
They are the Michigan Alliance Against Hate Crimes (MIAAHC) and Building Respect in 
Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity (BRIDGES). MIAAHC is a statewide coalition 
developed to promote “consistent and coordinated response to hate crimes and bias 
incidents perpetrated in Michigan.”103 BRIDGES was established shortly after 9/11 and 
combines leaders representing both Arab-American and Middle Eastern communities 
throughout the metro-Detroit region with representatives of various federal law 
enforcement agencies. Among the organization’s key goals are taking action to promote a 
better cultural understanding and sensitivity, collaborating with law enforcement and 
addressing what members of local Arab-American and Middle Eastern communities have 
experienced in the way of backlash.104 Campus police awareness of the issues facing their 
unique populations provide opportunities for them to assess their organizations’ capacity 
to foster respect and understanding while promoting a coordinated response to hate crimes 
on campus similar to the MIAAHC. Likewise, BRIDGES provides campus police an 
example of a collaborative effort between Arab-American and Middle Eastern 
communities and local, state, and federal law enforcement to improve cultural 
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understanding. An example of a campus police department’s adoption of this precept in 
order to increase communication through an organizational strategy can be found at the 
Michigan State University Police Department. The Michigan State University police 
campus worked with their community to proactively address the unique needs of the Arab-
American and Middle Eastern (Muslim) community as well.  
The Michigan State University Police Department created an Inclusion and Anti-
Bias Unit in 2016 to improve community relations with the Muslim community. The 
department is “committed to proactively addressing police and community-related issues 
associated with bias.”105 According to the department’s website, “The unit … will work 
in collaboration with all members of the university community to provide internal and 
external training to raise awareness and help create an inclusive culture on the MSU 
campus.”106 This mission statement is a solid example of how campus police adapted in 
an innovative manner to the rising number of hate crimes.  
The diversity of a campus can be either deliberate or unintentional. To illustrate, 
elite institutions, including Yale, Harvard, Cornell, Princeton, Dartmouth, UPenn, Brown, 
and Columbia, attract and enroll a large percentage of international students. While 
international students comprised 4 percent of total student enrollment in all institutions of 
higher education in the United States in 2015―from small private colleges to large state 
universities―they represented 10.6 percent of student enrollment among the eight Ivy 
League schools.107 This difference represents more than 6,000 international students 
among these eight schools.108 According to the Institute of International Education’s Open 
Doors report, the number of foreign students in the United States has been on an upward 
                                                 
105 “New MSU Police Unit Focuses on Anti-Bias, Inclusion,” Michigan State University, February 8, 
2016, https://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2016/new-msu-police-unit-focuses-on-anti-bias-inclusion/. 
106 Michigan State University. 
107 “Yale: By the Numbers,” Yale University, accessed September 18, 2015, https://www.yale.edu/
about-yale/yale-facts. 
108 Yale University. 
47 
trajectory for the last decade.109 Campus police leaders, along with their administrators, 
must recognize and devise an organizational strategy to meet the needs of an international 
community. This can be achieved by performing specific tasks that would include 
assigning campus police as liaisons to campus cultural centers, engaging community 
cultural organizations, and recruiting police officers with varied ethnic backgrounds to 
serve on college campuses.  
D. ANALYSIS, MEASUREMENT, AND EVALUATION 
Another core component of community policing and college campuses is the 
analysis, measurement, and evaluation of crime statistics and the effectiveness of crime 
reduction programs. To guide their operations, campus police and college campuses must 
analyze, measure, and evaluate the efficacy of what they do. Campus crime statistics 
provide key data for such analysis. The U.S. Department of Education’s “The Tools You 
Need for Campus Safety and Security Analysis,” which provides an analysis of crime 
statistics, attests to the importance of such data.110 Likewise, data provided in the most 
recent Bureau of Justice Statistics Campus Law Enforcement Special Report further 
validates this view.111 Both sources of data provide the public with information about 
campus crime and fire data. These sources continue to illustrate that university and college 
campuses are generally safe places with campus crime decreasing by 35 percent since 
2005. This statistic is consistent with the national trend.112 Burglary accounts for more 
than 50 percent of campus crime and sexual assault accounts for 32 percent of campus 
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crime.113 Such crime reports can help campus police to focus their efforts on securing 
personal property as well as personal safety. 
Analysis, evaluation, and measurement of campus safety strategies can vary 
significantly from campus to campus. This discrepancy may be largely due to two factors: 
the complexity of campus public safety—including sworn police, non-sworn security, or a 
hybrid of the two; and the composition and demographics of colleges and universities—
urban, rural, state, or private. To account for this divergence, the evaluation of campus 
safety strategies should consider continuously improving the following cycle of activities 
that I find applicable to all of the four campus settings: preventing and reducing crime, 
enforcing the law, and serving the community. Campus police can institutionalize this 
cycle of activities by adopting crime reduction and accountability meetings using the 
CompStat process. CompStat is a process for using crime statistics on a block-by-block 
basis that allows management to target its resources where crimes take place.114 This 
increased focus on management and trend analysis is far more effective than random 
patrols or ineffective resource management by municipal or campus police.  
CompStat was created by the New York Police Department (NYPD) and police 
scholars credit it for reducing crime in New York City.115 The process revolutionized 
policing by using a data-driven approach. At its most basic level, CompStat uses 
computerized statistical information and mapping capability that enables police leaders to 
see crime trends on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. Inimai M. Chettiar, 
director of the Justice Program at New York University Law School’s Brennan Center, 
opined that the “hallmarks of CompStat are its strong management and accountability 
techniques within a police department as well as its reliance on data collection to identify 
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crime patterns.”116 Thorough analysis of crimes and trends allows police personnel to 
devise strategies and tactics to solve problems, reduce crime, and ultimately improve the 
quality of life in their communities. The prompt availability of information positions 
department leadership to assess and implement strategies to address increases in crime and 
use resources more efficiently in the process. CompStat has empowered police departments 
to focus the resources of the departments around their core mission, which is most often to 
reduce crime and the fear of crime. Arguably, the use of CompStat reduces arrests by 
disrupting the opportunities for crimes to occur. Tangentially, CompStat also improves 
organizational efficiency, response to crime, and commitment to service in the community.  
Campus safety personnel should have their own form of CompStat-style crime 
reduction meetings as an opportunity to engage their management team and members of 
their community. Weekly, biweekly, or monthly CompStat-style crime analysis and 
accountability meetings with staff provide campus leaders an opportunity to measure the 
most recent crime statistics against another period, allowing for a structured process for 
helping to ensure accountability and focus. Supervisors are held accountable for helping to 
develop and execute strategies to address existing crime problems or community concerns. 
The close scrutiny of previous crimes and crime trends by policing leaders enables them to 
allocate resources to prevent future incidents.  
Combining the primary elements of community policing, “community partnerships 
between the police and other organizations; organizational transformation to support 
community partnerships and problem-solving; the systematic examination of problems to 
develop and evaluate effective responses”—in addition to adhering to the Clery Act in a 
comprehensive campus policing program—can provide synergies similar to those realized 
in many cities that have adopted and instituted these core practices.117 Numerous measures 
have proven readily transferable to the campus environment, from establishing key 
alliances through strategic partnerships among stakeholders to pursuing initiatives that 
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foster campus engagement and involvement. Many campuses are already elevating the 
presence of their safety personnel through high-visibility patrols. In addition, many 
campuses are recognizing the value of leveraging connections among their police with on-
campus organizations and activities. These efforts open valuable channels of 
communication fundamental in ensuring sustainable change and organizational 
transformation to support best practices and desired outcomes, especially in a post-9/11 
world. A campus police department committed to community policing, familiar with its 
campus community, knowledgeable of campus crime trends, aligned with campus 
stakeholders, skilled in using programs and systems for communicating, and fully aware 
of its campus’s unique issues, positions the department to assist federal, state, and local 




IV. UNDERSTANDING HOW UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES CAN 
CONTRIBUTE TO COUNTERTERRORISM 
Although campuses have become safer since the passage of the Clery Act and many 
campus police leaders are applying the principles of community policing, the inherent 
openness and accessibility of college campuses make them uniquely vulnerable to targeted 
violence and terrorist plots. Campuses were identified as potential “soft targets” for 
terrorists by FBI Director Robert Mueller in testimony before Congress in February 
2003.118 Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission Report called for a unity of effort in five areas, 
one of which has a direct impact on local law enforcement: strengthening the FBI and 
homeland security defenders.119 Although the 9/11 Commission Report does not reference 
campus police directly, it can be reasonably argued that its statement includes them.  
Following the Virginia Tech massacre in 2007, Steven Healy, former president of 
the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, opined in his 
speech before the House Committee on Education and Labor that “campuses are not 
immune from safety threats and other dangers facing our society.”120 Healy further stated 
that campuses must be “realistic about these threats and act proactively to prevent and 
respond to the inevitable crises and incidents.”121 This chapter details the strategies 
campus police can use to maintain a safe campus and how campus safety leaders can 
engage in and benefit from the broader homeland security efforts.  
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A. ALLIANCES AMONG INSTITUTES OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND 
THE GOVERNMENT 
In a 2005, report, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented 
Policing recommended that “campus police and security operations should be a viable part 
of the nation’s intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and application processes.”122 
That same year, former FBI Director Mueller established the National Security Higher 
Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB). The NSHEAB comprises approximately 25 
university chancellors and presidents and its objective is to promote a deeper understanding 
and cooperation between higher education and several government agencies. The 
NSHEAB’s specific mission is “to bridge historical gaps between the U.S. Intelligence 
Community and academe with respect to national security issues.”123 The board meets 
several times a year in Washington, DC, and discusses national security matters relevant 
to academic research facilities. The College and University Security Effort, or CAUSE, 
joins FBI agents in charge of the 56 field offices with the heads of colleges and universities 
in their areas to discuss issues brought up at NSHEAB meetings, which enables a feedback 
loop.  
In 2008, as part of a broader effort by the FBI to reach out to campuses, the bureau 
created the Campus Liaison Initiative “to combat the threat of international and domestic 
terrorism.”124 Each campus—regardless of whether it has a police department or non-
sworn security department within the jurisdiction of a field office—is assigned an FBI 
agent. The assignment of an agent establishes a point of contact for each campus, promotes 
two-way information sharing, increases awareness, and provides training for campus 
administrators and public safety personnel. Arguably, the FBI’s efforts to align federal 
resources with the higher education community in advancing their counterterrorism efforts 
include some of the same trademarks of community policing: partnerships and problem 
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solving. As Herman Goldstein described in his book, Problem Oriented Policing, the 
“police would be more effective in their work if they were more proactive in their efforts 
to understand and control crime rather than just responding to crimes after they have 
occurred.”125 The FBI’s NSHEAB and Campus Liaison Program create pathways for 
senior campus administrators, campus police, and security to form partnerships, share 
information and concerns, and engage in problem solving before an incident or crime 
occurs on campus.  
Former President Jimmy Carter remarked in a speech at Yale University in 2014 
that “the most revered or respected institutions in America are its universities and its 
military.”126 Unlike the country’s military installations, college campuses are neither 
fortresses nor have they been designed to reduce opportunities for attacks. Quite the 
opposite, they are designed as open communities within a host community―a city or 
town―promoting access to education and research, serving as attractions for employment 
and tourism while positively impacting local and regional economies.127 A 2014 study by 
Annette Steinacker titled The Economic Effect of Urban Colleges on their Surrounding 
Communities supports this claim. Steinacker concluded “that even small campuses can play 
a very strong economic role in their hometowns” in describing the economic impact of 
small colleges with a predominately commuter population in its host city.128 Steinacker’s 
study focuses on urban colleges because not much is known about the economic impact of 
small suburban colleges. Her work adds to what is already known about the positive 
economic impact of larger institutions and those in non-urban areas.  
In a study of how colleges and universities can help their local economies, Abel 
and Deitz argued in the Journal of Economic Geography that “colleges and universities are 
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increasingly being viewed as engines of local economic development.”129 Later, in 2015, 
a Task Force on the Federal Regulation of Higher Education convened by a bipartisan 
group of senators completed its work and noted in its executive summary that 
“postsecondary education is a linchpin in the nation’s social and economic strength.”130 
Research by Jonathan Rothwell of the Brookings Institute concluded in 2015 that “the 
average bachelor’s degree holder contributes $278,000 more to local economies through 
direct spending over the course of his or her lifetime and 42 percent of alumni from four-
year colleges remain in the area where they attended college” following graduation.131 
These reports do not outline the steps campuses should take to guard against local crime or 
potential terrorist attacks, nor do they discuss the economic impact of crime or terrorism. 
Insofar as campuses have become linked to local, regional, and state economic success, the 
safety of our campuses should be a high a priority on local, state, and federal levels. 
Campus police and security are positioned as key stakeholders in a campus’s 
counterterrorism efforts.  
B. JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES 
The FBI’s counterterrorism efforts and safety of American campuses could be 
improved beyond the FBI’s NSHEAB and Campus Liaison Program through its JTTFs. 
JTTFs represent a collaborative effort to prevent and respond to the threat of terrorism and 
work under the jurisdiction of the FBI. Each field office features a diverse staffing model 
with JTTF officers deputized as special U.S. marshals. As such, they are required to obtain 
top-secret security clearance. Regular meetings ensure that appropriate leaders are briefed 
on current matters germane to their jurisdictions as well as regional and national trends.  
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C. THREATS TO CAMPUSES 
A spate of attacks on campus have highlighted the need for campus security to have 
countermeasures for terrorism. The attack at Ohio State in 2016 and, more recently, the 
January 2018 indictment of 19-year-old Tnuza Jamal Hassan, a former student at St. 
Catherine University in St. Paul, Minnesota, indicted for setting multiple fires on campus, 
exacerbated this shift.132 According to the criminal complaint against Hassan, she started 
the fires after “reading about the U.S. military destroying schools in Iraq or Afghanistan 
and she felt that she should do exactly the same thing.”133 Solo actors remain a concern to 
virtually all cities and communities because they may not have any obvious connection to 
a particular institution or cause. Likewise, colleges and universities should understand that 
the collective security of the nation relies on the ability to prevent, detect, and disrupt such 
a wide range of actors and groups unaffiliated with the institution.  
Today’s campus safety leaders operate in an environment in which the institution’s 
mission to propagate an exchange of ideas conflicts with a growing intolerance for differing 
opinions in today’s students. The openness and accessibility of college campuses along 
with a heightened awareness of the duty to protect community members with differing 
views from harassment and discrimination are all emerging and converging challenges 
facing university campuses today. The most vivid example of extreme views conflicting 
on an open campus happened at the University of Virginia in August 2017.134 Protesting 
the removal of Confederate statues from a local park, white supremacists marched through 
the campus carrying torches while chanting racist and anti-Semitic slogans on the evening 
before a scheduled rally. The march was covered by the national media and print 
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newspapers. These actions represented a bold, intimidating, and highly visible way of 
expressing extremist views and garnering support on a college campus.  
Traditionally, university campuses are recognized as environments that promote 
civility in intellectual growth along with encouraging an exchange of ideas. In response to 
guest speakers espousing both conservative and liberal views, the media have increasingly 
reported similar situations on college campuses nationwide. The greatest resistance has 
been to speakers who espouse violence. Right-wing political commentator Ben Shapiro 
spoke at UC Berkeley in 2017, garnering the attention of hundreds of protestors. The 
university spent $600,000 for security to protect his rights and those of his supporters and 
detractors when he delivered his speech on campus.135 Students and faculty alike risk 
being threatened physically, harassed on social media, or subjected to reputational harm 
for exercising their right to free speech on college campuses.  
Extreme views expressed in increasingly violent ways on college campuses 
threaten the well-regarded process for intellectual growth and discovery in a democratic 
society. In a 1975 report, C. Vann Woodward stated intellectual growth and discovery 
represents the “need for unfettered freedom, the right to think the unthinkable, discuss the 
unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable.”136 Woodward also noted that on our 
campuses, “curtailing free expression strikes twice at intellectual freedom, for whoever 
deprives another of the right to state unpopular views necessarily also deprives others of 
the right to listen to those views.”137 While Woodward does not qualify what, precisely, 
constitutes an unpopular view, it can be construed that views expressed by any speaker are 
never representative of an entire audience or population. Depending on the sentiments and 
ideas shared by a speaker on a college campus and the audience in attendance, the reaction 
could easily range from overwhelming support to expressions of disagreement or even 
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outrage. For example, conservative students on the campus of the University of Minnesota 
were subjected to threats on social media and became the focus of protestors for inviting 
conservative speakers to campus in December 2017.138 Conversely, at Princeton 
University, an assistant professor of African-American studies felt compelled to cancel 
several public speaking engagements following “hateful messages and death threats” she 
had received because of her criticism of President Donald Trump and commencement 
remarks he had made at another university.139 A professor at Drexel University was 
prevented from coming onto the college campus without a police escort and was forced to 
teach a class remotely after he posted several controversial posts about race on social 
media. He received numerous death threats.140 Campus upheaval resulting from extremist 
viewpoints can set the stage for a tipping point event wherein one side attempts to go to 
extremes (such as in Charlottesville) or an even more lethal event such as a bombing or 
mass shooting.  
Another threat homeland security defenders and campus safety leaders are facing 
is online radicalization facilitated largely by the spreading of radical ideology over the 
internet. White supremacists disseminating white nationalist propaganda and jihadists 
delivering radical Islamic sermons can express their views freely on globally connected 
platforms to reach potential followers. College students can be seduced and recruited 
without a single conversation, a face-to-face meeting, or an exchange of money or personal 
information. A September 2015 New York Times article by Rukmini Callimachi, describing 
how a young woman in Washington State became friendly with ISIS supporters and 
converted to Islam through social media, illustrates the power of social media and how it 
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is used to influence.141 Brandi Lynn Evans Monroe also explored this situation in a 2016 
thesis titled Brand Caliphate and Recruitment between the Genders. Monroe studied six 
cases in which Western women were “radicalized in support of IS.”142 A conclusion 
reached as a result of her research was that “the role in marketing and Brand Caliphate 
remains key in developing the initial interest in IS and the females probing for online 
information.”143 In Callimachi’s article, she further described how ISIS “maintains a 24-
hour online operation,” noting, “the reach of the Islamic State’s recruiting effort has been 
multiplied by an enormous cadre of operators on social media.”144 Similar to college 
campuses, the Internet’s openness and accessibility enables people to connect with one 
another and exchange a wide variety of ideas and experiences.  
Campus police leaders and university administrators are committed to creating a 
safe and secure campus community while maintaining an appropriately open, inviting, and 
vibrant campus environment. In addition to the normal range of security concerns that arise 
on any campus, they must now contend with a new range of potential threats to campuses. 
The vehicle and knife attack at Ohio State University, the acts of arson at St. Catherine 
University, the Unite the Right rally and march at the University of Virginia, and the 
damage caused by rioters at Berkeley are examples of the range of potential threats facing 
college campuses. Campus police leaders should endeavor to be even more engaged and 
open to partnerships with other local, state, and federal agencies.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In addressing the fundamental research question at the foundation of this thesis—
what does a CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing reveal about the potential value of 
campus police inclusion in FBI JTTFs?—it is arguably clear that strategic partnerships 
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between campus police and the FBI can significantly enhance college campuses’ ability to 
identify, detect, prevent or deter, and investigate emerging threats. The CFA was critical 
in addressing a threat scenario for which there is little textbook or playbook guidance. This 
is discussed more fully in the Literature Review in Chapter I. Threats to campus safety 
represent a rapidly emerging field of study requiring new strategies, protocols, and 
solutions. Campus policing in an era of continued terrorist threats remains one of the 
biggest challenges in the decades ahead. Recommendations following the CFA of the 
Boston Marathon bombing offer solutions to be investigated and implemented. 
Beginning with the Boston Marathon attack in 2013, a number of senior leaders in 
campus policing questioned how many other would-be attackers are enrolled at our 
institutions of higher learning and living in campus housing. In 2014, University of 
California, Santa Barbara, student Elliot Rodger killed six people and injured 14 others 
near the university. In 2015, the arrest of Alexander Ciccolo, a Boston Police captain’s son, 
for plotting an ISIS inspired attack against a college campus, was yet another reminder that 
campuses are attractive targets. In 2015, a college student, Faisal Mohammad, went on a 
crime spree, stabbing four people before being shot and killed by campus police on the 
campus of the University of California, Merced. In 2016, another campus attack at Ohio 
State University stunned the higher education community. The attacker, Abdul Razak Ali 
Artan, a Somali, injured 13 people when he drove his car into a crowd, exited the vehicle, 
and began attacking bystanders with a knife.  
Threats to college campuses continue to develop. According to FBI Director 
Christopher Wray, nontraditional collectors of intelligence (researchers and faculty 
members) working on behalf of the People’s Republic of China are involved in 
collaborative research on American college campuses, threatening the security of 
American research and, by extension, campuses.145  
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Areas recommended for future research include campus police participation in 
JTTFs or other specialized units within the FBI to address emerging threats to academic 
research. Further research is also recommended into the applicability and feasibility of 
developing and instituting the equivalent of suspicious activity reports (SAR) used 
presently by the FBI, but created specifically for college campuses. This would provide a 
means by which to accurately capture, track, trend, and analyze potential and actual 
terrorist threats. A subsequent research study would be cross-referencing data with the 
eGuardian system, offering truly universal access across a community of law enforcement 
professionals at local, state, and federal levels and college campus police most in need of 
this critical data. Another important question to answer in the near future is this: What 
should campus security look like in a climate of ongoing terrorist threats? 
Development and management oversight for such ambitious endeavors brings with 
it inherent challenges—from funding sources to accountability and authority. Questions 
likely to be raised, for example, are which entity would oversee a wholly unified, cross-
referenced system: the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, or another national 
agency. Additionally, the role that campus policing leadership would play in both 
development and implementation would need to be addressed. It is posited that there would 
be a very strong appetite for furthering this research and the identification, development, 
and implementation of methods that enhance overall campus safety in an environment 
replete with threats of potential terrorist activity. 
My research and subsequent CFA attempted to determine the relative benefit of 
assigning a campus police TFO versus the cost of not doing so. It is my hope that this thesis 
contributes to the growing body of knowledge about campus policing and the value of 
campus police participation in JTTFs for the benefit of campus police chiefs, campus 
administrators, and the FBI.  
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